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Article
The Role of Power 
in Organizational 
Corruption: An Empirical 
Study
István Jávor1 and David Jancsics2
Abstract
This article concerns the extent to which corrupt behavior is dependent 
on the organizational power structure and the resources available for 
illegal exchange. This qualitative study is based on 42 in-depth interviews 
with organizational actors in different organizations in Hungary. Four core 
themes emerged from the analysis of the interviews: (a) isolated corruption 
at the bottom, (b) the middle level’s own corruption, (c) “technicization” 
when middle-level professionals and expert groups are used to legalize the 
corruption of the dominant coalition, and (d) “turning-off controls” when 
organizational elites intentionally deactivate internal and external controls 
to avoid detection.
Keywords
organizational corruption, power structure, Central and Eastern Europe
Almost all corrupt transactions have organizational aspects, as the partici-
pants are typically organizational members or have organizational affilia-
tions. However we know surprisingly little about the forces that give rise to 
and sustain corruption within organizations. Most scholars assume that it is 
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very hard to study corruption up close, believing that those in the know will 
refuse to talk for fear of prosecution or retribution. Some researchers try to 
understand corruption by looking at cases that have previously been uncov-
ered and prosecuted, but that strategy also has its problems: Cases that are 
uncovered by journalists or by the police or by fact-finding commissions 
rarely provide an insider’s understanding, and may be biased by the political 
interests of the investigators (Vaughan, 2006).
Most research on corruption has tended to go down the easier route, and 
that means using survey research to capture the perceptions of a population 
about corruption in their society. These perceptions can be aggregated into 
“corruption indices” that can then be linked to macro-level variables such as 
economic development, the quality of legal institutions in the society, gov-
ernment size, and intensity of competition (Treisman, 2000; Venard, 2008). 
Such studies have their place, but they cannot provide us with a picture of 
how corruption works within organizations, or about who the players are, 
what their roles in corruption are, and so on.
These gaps in the literature, the lack of insight into how corruption evolves, 
inspired our research project. In this qualitative empirical study, we provide 
a picture of corruption based on interviews with people inside organizations, 
individuals who themselves have been corrupt or have dealt with others who 
are involved in incorrupt activities. Our data cover figures at all levels of 
organizations. The empirical research we report here was carried out in 
Hungary in 2010. We conducted 42 in-depth interviews with employees who 
were actually participating in corruption or at least had a very close and direct 
insight into the phenomenon. We talked to top executives, middle managers, 
professionals, and lower level employees in both state and privately owned 
companies and governmental organizations.
In this research project, we used the widely accepted definition of organi-
zational corruption claiming that corruption is abuse or misuse of authority 
for personal, subunit, or organizational benefits (Anand, Ashforth, Joshi, & 
Martini, 2004; Sherman, 1980). This research did not begin with established 
hypotheses. We believe that inductively developed concepts and theory from 
rich data may contribute to the discovery of original and heuristic ideas. In 
contrast to this, testing logically deduced hypothesis often leads to only 
slightly modified versions of already existing theories (Charmaz, 2006, 
pp. 4-5; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). However, in our project we did not go in 
completely blindly. At the outset, we wanted to obtain a better insight into 
organizational corruption by collecting real and detailed cases of corruption. 
We were interested in factors such as hiding mechanisms and collusion that 
might contribute to “successful,” not detected corruption.
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Our interest in the role of resources emerged from preliminary interviews. 
We found that without access to organizational resources, corruption would 
not be possible, because different forms of organizational resources are what 
corrupt actors exchange illegally. Sometimes there is slack (Bourgeois, 1981) 
in an organization, surplus or unexploited opportunities in the system that 
might be marketable in corrupt exchanges. In other cases, corrupt actors cre-
ate resources by squeezing the organization’s formal operational structure, 
for example by lowering the quality standards or “milking” other organiza-
tional assets.
There is often some slack in complex systems that can be used for illegal 
purposes (Perrow, 1986, pp. 14-20; Schulman, 1989), and those firms with 
slack plentifully available have more alternatives to behave illegally than 
other firms with less slack (Baucus & Near, 1991). Here is one example. A 
middle manager in a sales department of a private firm in Hungary told us 
that he always finds slack in the system:
You know, even if we are in the middle of the financial crisis and even if our 
German mother company is messing with us, I can take out a few hundred 
thousand forints [HUF] for myself in every month [illegally]. I think my boss 
knows about this but he just does not care because I bring much more money 
for the company. I can let my people in the department “deliver the numbers” 
for the Germans . . . and this is what matters.
But a resource can be anything transmitted from one person to another 
(Foa, 1976), and we discovered that the resources being exchanged are often 
not money; they took different forms such as decisional power over assigning 
benefits or influencing selection processes, providing restricted information 
relating to bidding procedures or to future plans, the ability to set up and 
legitimize organizational rules and values; control over accelerating, slowing 
down, delaying, or manipulating administrative processes; or informal con-
tacts with other influential actors.
The allocation of resources in an organization is typically very unequal 
and often determined by power relations (Hills & Mahoney, 1978; Pfeffer & 
Leong, 1977; Rajan & Zingales, 2000). After initial interviews, we recog-
nized that the forms and the amounts of resources that corrupt actors illegally 
exchange depend both on organizational actors’ power positions and on their 
relations with others. Therefore, we refined our research question to study 
available resources in an organization and actors’ power relations, two struc-
tural sources of corruption within formal social systems.
This article is based on an organizational power approach. Our power con-
cept has three definitional elements. First, we agree with Dahl’s (1957) power 
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definition: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do some-
thing that B would not otherwise do” (pp. 202-203). According to Dahl, the 
basis of one’s power includes resources, opportunities, acts, objects that can 
be exploited to affect others’ behavior. Second, as Bacharach and Lawler 
(1981) claim, “‘Outcome’ is an important implicit element of power. Power 
must be an impelling influence, therefore, power that is not impelling is not 
power at all” (p. 45). The final condition of our power concept comes from 
Pfeffer (1992) who argues that an important source of power is the “match 
between style, skill, and capacities and anything that is required in a situa-
tion” (p. 77).
Our main premise is that organizational actors’ access to resources and 
opportunities depends on the persons’ position in the power structure. Their 
power position also determines the actors’ ability to influence and manipulate 
the allocation of such resources, the content of contracts, and other organiza-
tional data. We analyze organizational corruption through the lens of power 
relations. The opportunities to be corrupt vary among organizational levels. 
Different amounts and types of resources are available for illegal exchange 
for a top executive, for a middle-level manager, and for a low-level employee. 
Those who participate in corruption may use the organizational opportunity 
structure for individual, group, or organizational benefits. We argue that the 
sum of corrupt individual acts creates an institutionalized system of corrup-
tion within an organizational context.
The two main research questions we answer here are as follows: (a) What 
kinds of resources are used illegally at different levels of an organization? 
and (b) which mechanisms make corruption effective? Corruption is “effec-
tive” if corrupt actors can illegally siphon off organizational resources and 
extract considerable amount of profit from the transaction while they mini-
mize the chance of being detected.
Theory and Background: Individual Versus 
Systemic Approaches
Greedy employees are often blamed for failing to resist temptation and for 
becoming corrupt. “Bad apple” theories suggest that individual greed, unethi-
cal behavior, and crude rational self-interest are responsible for organiza-
tional corruption (Trevino, 1986; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990). In this view, 
corruption is for private benefit (Aguilera & Vadera, 2008) and is typically a 
violation of an organization’s formal goals. This is corruption against the 
organization. This utility-based model often views corrupt individuals as 
atomized human actors who do not have social relations with each other.
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Because it overlooks systemic elements behind corruption, this greedy 
individual approach provides little explanation for how widespread long-
term corruption remains invisible within an organization, to investors, busi-
ness partners, regulators, and other external watchdogs. In contrast, a “bad 
barrel” view of corruption argues that organizational deviance and corruption 
are not exceptional individual events, but instead are systematic results of a 
complex combination of different factors, including environmental forces, 
organizational structures and processes, and individual choices. The “bad 
apples versus bad barrels dichotomy” was discussed by several scholars 
(Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Trevino, 2008; Coleman, 1987; Pinto, Leana, 
& Pil, 2008; Wheeler & Rothman, 1982). From this second perspective, orga-
nizational systems and structure may facilitate or enable corrupt behavior. 
Corrupt behaviors may even be taken in accordance with organizational goals 
and thus the organization, not the individual, is the primary beneficiary of the 
illegal activities (Baker & Faulkner, 1993). Organizational structural features 
such as the division of labor, geographic dispersion, and the presence of spe-
cialized units ensure “structural secrecy,” and provide opportunities to con-
duct corrupt practices invisibly (Vaughan, 1996, pp. 196-278; Vaughan, 
1999). A meta-analysis reviewed 30 years of research on unethical decision 
in organizations and concluded that there are multiple facilitators of this com-
plex phenomenon (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Trevino, 2010). Bad barrels, 
the ethical issue itself (bad cases), and bad apples play a role as well. However, 
the authors also claim that bad and good social environments (“barrels”) cre-
ated by organizations have especially strong influence on individual-level 
unethical decisions.
Corruption may become taken for granted and perpetuated in some orga-
nizations (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). When corruption becomes institutional-
ized, this means that stable and repetitive patterns of illegal activity emerge 
that are conducted by many people in the organization without much thought 
or reflection about the nature of their actions. The initial corrupt action is 
gradually embedded in organizational structures and processes. Thus, a devi-
ant culture arises within an organization to tolerate collective corruption, and 
repeatedly enacted corruption becomes routine, an everyday mechanical 
action without the necessity for thought.
Actual strategies that are used by the actors and the relationship structures 
between participants constitute a relatively unexplored field in corruption 
research. We know little about what mechanisms are used to hide corrupt 
deals and how power dynamics shape the actors’ behavior at different levels 
of organizational hierarchy. Using actual corrupt cases, this study is intended 
to provide some pieces for this incomplete puzzle.
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Corruption From the Bottom-Up or the Top-
Down?
A few scholars focus on the role of hierarchical levels within the organization 
in corrupt practices. Pinto et al. (2008) argue that an “organization of corrupt 
individuals” is a bottom-up phenomenon where individuals are the primary 
beneficiaries of corruption at the cost of the organization. This form of orga-
nizational corruption is manifested at the lower level or “periphery” of the 
organization and usually involves only internal actors. The opposite version 
looks at organizations that have been highly corrupt, and at corporate crime 
as a top-down phenomena where the organizational elite has embraced cor-
rupt ways of doing business for its own clique’s benefit or to benefit the 
whole organization. This latter type of corruption typically involves the 
“core” of the organization, sometimes with third parties or external actors.
Sometimes, top management teams can cause middle-level employees to 
become corrupt by setting unrealistic financial and sales goals that are not 
achievable legally, and then just turn a blind eye to the illicit means by which 
employees achieve them (Ashforth et al., 2008). The phone-tapping scandal 
in the British newspaper industry in 2011 seems to follow this pattern. In this 
case, due to the extreme rivalry in the media industry, journalists engaged in 
phone hacking and police bribery and did whatever it took to publish a story 
before the competition. However, there are also cases in which high-ranking 
corporate officials pressure their employees into illegal behavior. Refusal to 
engage in such corrupt acts would lead to negative sanctions from the execu-
tives. In this situation, middle-level actors participate in corruption because 
of fear. In contrast to this “crime-coercive” model, other, “crime-facilitative,” 
systems (Needleman & Needleman, 1979) provide high incentives and 
opportunities, together with low risks, that encourage and facilitate middle-
level employees’ corruption.
When corrupt cliques are detected, middle-level participants may play a 
buffering role to “take the fall” and protect their bosses. These middle-level 
managers are more likely to be found guilty and punished more harshly com-
pared with top managers (Baker & Faulkner, 1993; Jackall, 2010, p. 90). 
Clinard and Yeager (1980) found that most of the cases they studied of 
employees charged with criminal antitrust violations were middle managers. 
However, the senior management were often aware of these illegal activities. 
Although these scholars provide some interesting examples of corrupt prac-
tices at organizational layers, the literature still lacks a more detailed model 
about different organizational level’s role in corruption. The aim of this arti-
cle is to offer some explanations of this phenomenon.
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Three Levels of the Power Structure
In organizations, power is omnipresent because “getting things done requires 
power” (Pfeffer, 1992). Actors at different organizational levels differ from 
each other based on their ability to control crucial resources and procedures 
and effect organizational outcomes (Mintzberg, 1979). Following this analy-
sis, we distinguish between three organizational power zones, each with its 
own function in the firm or organization:
The Dominant Coalition
James Thompson (1967, p. 128) used the term dominant coalition to repre-
sent “the agents of social control” who are powerful enough to control other 
member’s behavior and determine the operative organizational goals, which 
may differ from its manifest or formal goals. This elite group controls the 
critical organizational resources necessary to continue functioning, regulates 
allocation of resources, makes rules and strategic decisions, and enforces 
regulations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, p. 48). This is also the level of an orga-
nization where politics is most evident, building pragmatic compromises 
among different interest groups within an organization. Only a well-established 
and relatively large coalition of the elite can ensure the survival of an organi-
zation (March & Simon, 1958). Although the dominant coalition mostly 
includes the members of the top management team, there may be some “sig-
nificant outsiders” or figures at middle levels who can control critical 
resources and there are sometimes people formally at the top, who are not 
really part of the real organizational power elite.
The Middle-Level Mediator Zone
The middle-level mediator zone contains specialists, organizational profes-
sionals, expert groups, and middle managers. Although middle-level officials 
have some decision-making autonomy, the most important source of their 
organizational power is expertise. They maintain power because top-ranking 
actors are dependent on them for their skills and their access of certain kinds 
of information and organizational processes (Mechanic, 1962). Among their 
professional tasks, members at this level have another important role in the 
organizational power system. They transform the orders or directions of the 
dominant coalition into applicable form. Steers (1977, pp. 30-36) highlights 
elements such as measurement, goal displacement, vague motivation and 
rules, and so on that link actors at different organizational levels informally 
and influence the relationship structures, communication patterns, and 
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interest games between them. They communicate the compromises of the 
elite, translating the language of power into the language of the formal proce-
dures and executable actions. This middle level converts the results of power 
struggles among the elite into performance assessments, salaries, bonuses, 
and employee stock options (Jávor, 1988). We call this level the mediator 
zone.
Another function of this zone is to protect the dominant coalition against 
the outside influences. Problems and conflicts that arise lower down the orga-
nization do not get passed directly to the dominant coalition, but often get 
stuck (or are hidden) in this middle mediator zone (Steers, 1977). Because 
cooperation between the mediator zone and the elite is a part of the everyday 
organizational operation, the zone closely observes many activities at the top. 
Thus, the relationships between these two levels of an organization are based 
on trust and have a political as well as a technical aspect (Feldman, 1976). 
The basis of the middle level’s power derives from its almost exclusive con-
trol over the technical system and over organizational boundaries as well as 
intermediate decisions of the organization; its special knowledge of law, eco-
nomics, accounting, engineering, computing, and so on. The mediator zone 
has its own interests and power that provide considerable potential for 
maneuvering and making formal and informal bargains (Pearlin, 1962).
The Bottom Level
A third power zone encompasses the lowest level of the organization. It is 
relatively easy to measure the performance and control the activities of peo-
ple at this level. Members of this zone have less room for maneuver or discre-
tion because their performance is less abstract and esoteric. The actors here 
do not have influence over important decisions and cannot control critical 
resources associated with strategic goals. However, even at this level, mem-
bers have some control over local technologies, information, and processes 
(Nichols & Armstrong, 1976).
Here the person’s physical location in the organization may also be a 
source of some power (Mechanic, 1962). Those who work close to the orga-
nization’s boundaries are able to control or affect transactions between the 
organization and the outside world. In these informal negotiations and deals 
with outsiders, street-level bureaucrats often neglect formal organizational 
goals (Blau, 1955). Others can accelerate or slow down processes, or operate 
machines, vehicles, and devices. Sometimes people at the bottom form coali-
tions with other lower participants and such acquaintances may give them the 
ability to control some organizational processes informally (Mechanic, 
1962). This also gives them power that is used to make informal deals and 
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reach compromises with managers (Gouldner, 1955). Such control opportu-
nities over some slack can become sources of resources for corruption at this 
level.
The Hungarian Context
Despite their fairly developed market economies and democratic political 
systems, many post-communist Eastern-European countries are places where 
corruption permeates social life from big public contracts at one end of the 
spectrum to very small everyday exchanges at the other. Petty corruption is 
found in all manners of transactions in Hungary (Jancsics, 2013). However 
the central locus of this corruption complex is the remarkably high level of 
state redistribution. The state aid in Hungary (as a percentage of GDP) spent 
on economic development projects is among the highest in the European 
Union and such huge grants have produced a phenomenon called “develop-
ment corruption” (Báger, 2011). In a recent report, Freedom House (2011), an 
independent global watchdog organization, estimated that 65% to 75% of the 
Hungarian public procurements are corrupt. Illegal campaign contributions 
also lead to profitable business arrangements with the government, which 
contributes to stable political corruption (Sajó, 2002).
In Hungary, the private and the nonprofit sectors as well as the public 
administration are highly politicized. There are many formal and informal 
ties between political parties and private and nonprofit organizations. From 
boards of directors to “old boy networks,” institutions outside of the state 
nevertheless tend to align with one political faction or another. (Böröcz, 
2000; Stark & Vedres, 2012).
Data and Research Strategy
Sample
We undertook 42 in-depth interviews with different organizational actors in 
Budapest between 2009 December and 2010 July. Thirty-nine interviews 
were conducted by the second author and three interviews by the first author. 
Corruption is a hidden activity. In our research, we used snowball sampling, 
a technique applicable when it is difficult to identify and contact the members 
of a target population. Snowball sampling is a process where each inter-
viewed respondent suggests other respondents who may have knowledge rel-
evant to the research project. Snowballing translates the trust that an 
interviewer has built up with one respondent into a “vouched-for” introduc-
tion to the next informant. Given the topic, this is a particularly suitable 
methodology.
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We began by drawing an initial group of Hungarian organizational actors, 
a wide spectrum from low-level private firm employees to top executives of 
national governmental organizations. We had 10 initial starting points, a mid-
dle-level manager at the Ministry of Education, a CEO at Hungarian subsid-
iary of an international distributor, four investigative journalists, a former 
assembly committee member of a local government in Budapest, a founder-
executive of a small company in the infrastructure sector, an economic policy 
adviser in the prime minister’s office, and a painter at a public company. The 
Hungarian Chapter of Transparency International also helped arrange inter-
views. Using this approach, we very soon gained access to different organiza-
tional populations who were eager to be interviewed and also highly affected 
by corruption. Finally, we interviewed people at 4 national and 5 local govern-
mental organizations, 5 state owned companies, and 13 private firms.
There are possible biases in this sampling method. For example, individu-
als may nominate others who think like them. In local and national govern-
mental organizations, we tried to reduce the chance of this kind of bias by 
interviewing actors from different opposing political parties. However, in 
most cases we could not control this problem. Nevertheless, our sample is 
diverse and includes individuals from different sectors, forms of ownership, 
firm size, and organizational position. Table 1 summarizes the organizational 
background characteristics of all the respondents. About 29% were (national 
and local) government members, 19% were state owned firm members, and 
38% were private firm members. As shown, 36% were top executives, 29% 
were middle-level managers or professionals, and 21% were lower level 
employees.
Interviews
We kept the first phase of interviews relatively broad, letting our interviewees 
“tell their stories.” At the beginning of each interview we allowed our inter-
viewees to spontaneously talk about corruption. We also asked them to tell us 
stories of corruption. From each of these informants, we elicited a catalogue 
of corruption, detailed instances of the corruption they had encountered or 
participated in during their organizational activities. We were interested in 
what is really happening in the black box. In an early phase of our research, 
we also obtained interviews with four investigative journalists who recently 
revealed the most serious and scandalous corrupt cases in Hungary. As a 
result of their exposure, several important Hungarian politicians and top 
executives were sent to jail in recent years. These journalists followed the 
“dirty money” through state owned and private firms and offshore compa-
nies. They searched at registry courts to uncover ownership structures and 
interlocking directorate networks of companies.
 at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on December 13, 2013aas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Jávor and Jancsics 11
Our interviews kept a fairly open framework rather than holding to a fixed 
sequence of standardized questions. Our interviewees were free to follow up 
or raise issues they found important. However the following questions were 
asked from all interviewees: Have you ever participated in corruption? If not, 
have you seen corruption close up? How did you get involved in a corrupt 
transaction? Can you describe the main phases of the transaction? What was 
your role in the transaction? What were the other (insider or outsider) actors’ 
role in the transaction? What was the organizational status of the actors? Why 
was the organization unable to prevent and control corruption? Were there 
other organizational members who did not participate but have knowledge 
about corruption? Why did they remain silent about it?
Analysis
All interviews were audiotaped and transcribed. Finally, we transcribed 
approximately 63 hr of interviews that ranged from 50 min up to 2.5 hr each, 
Table 1. Characteristics of All Respondents.
Respondents
Organizational background Number %
State administration
National government
  Top executive 2 29
  Middle manager, professional 3  
  Lower level employee 1  
Local government  
  Top executive 4  
  Middle manager, professional 2  
  Lower level employee 0  
State owned firm
 Top executive 3 19
 Middle manager, professional 3  
 Lower level employee 2  
Private firm
 Top executive 6 38
 Middle manager, professional 4  
 Lower level employee 6  
Small enterpreneur 2 5
Investigative journalist 4 9
Total 42 100
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with an average of about 90 min. Transcripts were coded by the second 
author, using Atlas Ti6 software, and the codes were reviewed by the first 
author. The disagreements on codes between the authors were resolved 
through ongoing negotiations. Finally, both authors agreed about all codes. 
The coding process was guided by the research questions. During the coding 
process, our main concern was to look for similar patterns of corrupt actions 
between and among different organizational settings.
We systematically compared each new corrupt case and its core elements 
with former ones, to decide whether it fitted in an existing category or repre-
sented a new one. During the research process, the authors arranged frequent 
meetings when they discussed the cases and the emerging categories and 
wrote theoretical and interpretative memos about the main themes. The data 
collection was partially controlled by the ongoing analysis and the develop-
ing concepts. In the meetings, we discussed the possible direction of theoreti-
cal sampling and, based on the available options, agreed about who would be 
the next interviewee in data collection (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, pp. 45-60). 
The interview questions were also influenced by our preliminary findings 
and slightly adjusted to each interview.
Our memos from the data collection period suggested that corruption has 
significantly different forms at different levels of the organizational hierar-
chy. Therefore, to organize the material, we sorted the text by organizational 
level (low, middle, and top) where the actual story happened. In the 42 coded 
transcripts, we identified 138 corruption cases, short stories about actual cor-
rupt transactions. Only a few stories are well detailed; most are incomplete 
capturing some particular aspects of the phenomenon. Of the 138 cases, 25% 
of the stories took place at the lower level of an organization; however, it was 
sometimes more difficult to distinguish middle-level from top-level corrupt 
cases because of the overlapping involvement of these two levels.
The first cycle of coding was “process coding” (Miles, Huberman, & 
Saldaña, 2013, p. 75) focusing on actions and interactions in our corruption 
stories that explained how and why actors were able to avoid detection. This 
initial coding process was closely stuck to the data and here we consciously 
avoided using too abstract notions. This provided us freedom and openness to 
find new ideas instead of relying on others’ earlier elaborated concepts 
(Charmaz, 2006, pp. 47-48). The second phase of coding was “pattern cod-
ing” (Miles et al., 2013, pp. 86-87) when we grouped our codes that described 
similar behaviors into more general and abstract units of analysis. It also 
reduced the large amount of codes into a much smaller number of categories. 
For example, the category of “Document Manipulation” that includes differ-
ent corruption hiding techniques emerged from the integration of process 
codes such as manipulating firm records, getting rid of personal data, 
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falsifying financial information, and so on. This second phase yielded nine 
larger categories.
In the final phase of our analysis, we synthesized our data and integrated 
the theoretical and interpretative memos and category systems into higher 
level of analytical meanings. Finally, four core themes emerged from this 
iterative process: (a) isolated corruption at the bottom, (b) the middle level’s 
own corruption, (c) “technicization,” and (d) turning-off controls. We use 
selected verbatim quotations in this article as examples to support our argu-
ment. The themes occur at different organizational power zones. Table 2 
summarizes the major themes and the related categories.
Here is an example of how we created one of our core themes, “techniciza-
tion,” from our empirical materials. During the coding process, we realized 
that several forms of corruption refer to collusion between elite members and 
middle-level employees and the actors’ joint effort to keep corruption secret 
constitutes an essential part of these stories. We also found that corruption hid-
ing techniques such as document manipulation, technological conditions, and 
bureaucratic errors are closely related to middle-level experts’ everyday orga-
nizational tasks. Then we understood that mainly the middle level does this 
“job” and hide illegal deals for the dominant coalition by manipulating docu-
ments, and hiding corrupt deals in technological conditions or bureaucratic 
errors. We concluded that all of these techniques are closely related to the 
organizational technology, normal organizational processes used to transform 
inputs into outputs. Therefore, we called this core theme “technicization.”
The presentation of findings follows the three organizational power zones 
and reflects the main research questions considering resources they may ille-
gally sell and how their corrupt practices are related to other levels.
Table 2. Core Themes and Categories.
Organizational power 
zone Core theme Category
Bottom Isolated collusion Isolated collusion
Mediator Middle level’s own 
corruption
Ad hoc deals
 Higher interests
 Technicization Document manipulation
 Technological conditions
 Bureaucratic errors
Dominant coalition Turning-off controls Inside control deactivation
 Outside control 
deactivation
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The Bottom Level: Isolated Collusion
We found that, although actors at lowest level of an organization do not have 
influence over important decisions and cannot control crucial resources, they 
still can find or create slack and sell resources by accelerating or delaying 
organizational processes, playing with time, holding back information, or as 
several examples from our interviews suggest giving permissions or turning 
a blind eye to the small offenses. Ticket inspectors, parking attendants, 
policemen, gatemen, bus drivers, and “street-level bureaucrats” are the most 
typical of corruption at bottom. Lower level employees who often have to 
contact with outsiders are best able to participate in corrupt practices and sell 
local organizational resources. They can also exploit their knowledge about 
and control over locally used technologies. They manipulate machines, infor-
mation, and administrative processes.
Our findings suggest that at this lowest level, small groups or cliques, 
rather than single individuals, are the primary beneficiaries of corruption. 
Knowledge about others’ corruption can be used in informal organizational 
bargains. Corruption, even at the lowest level, often requires cooperation 
among two or more individuals. Of the 35 low-level corruption cases we col-
lected, we found only 6 (17%) where one individual acted secretly without 
the knowledge of any other colleagues. A good example of pure individual 
corruption was a parking attendant, in a large shopping mall, who worked 
alone and “sold” parking spots for half price and pocketed the profit. However, 
when the illegal profit is higher and the activity is repeated, more sophisti-
cated techniques are necessary and individuals have to cooperate and negoti-
ate with others who see their wrongdoing. The following example from a 
cashier at a swimming pool in Budapest illustrates how actors manipulate 
technology (entry gates), collude, and share the illegal profit, and buy the 
silence of others with favors who know about corruption:
The gatemen can hack the entry system. These guys have a special technique to 
keep the gates open with their leg and do not let it measure the number of 
visitors. When the customer brings a ticket, which is actually an electronic 
card, to the entrance gates the gatemen takes the card but does not scan it. So, 
the customer is not registered electronically either by the scanner and nor by 
the gate’s mechanical counter. Then, the gatekeepers bring back the “unused” 
tickets to me and I resell them, but this time it is pure money for us. At the end 
of the day we share the “profit” . . . How would management know the actual 
number of the visitors a day? They really do not care if it was 3000 or 3100 . . . 
Only the swimming instructors know about our machinations but they are 
silent because we let their friends and relatives into the pool for free.
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Although lower level actors often collude with their supervisors or imme-
diate chiefs, the corruption here is rather isolated from the top levels of the 
organization. A CEO of an IT company, who often pays kickbacks in return 
for generous public tenders, even gave the following cynical opinion about 
corruption at the bottom:
Who cares what they doing there . . . it is pathetic . . . they can probably steal 
some package of printer paper and that is it.
Corruption at the bottom is typically invisible to higher level managers. 
Conversely, low-level employees do not see either the “big organizational 
games” or the nature of illegal deals higher up in the organization either; 
however, through gossip, they assume the existence of corruption at higher 
levels of their organization.
The Middle Level’s Role in Corruption
Our interviews suggest that in contrast to the lowest level corruption that is 
relatively isolated, middle-level actors and the dominant coalition are linked 
to each other in corrupt deals in many ways. Our data suggest that profession-
als and middle managers often assist in covering up the dominant coalition’s 
illegal deals. A top executive of a private firm explained,
Managers always need subordinates to conduct corruption. There are always 
people who assist their bosses in the dirty business. This is the part of their 
career strategy . . . They want to get higher in the hierarchy and will do anything 
for it . . . or also possible that they do dubious bookkeeping for their chiefs 
because this is the secret of the sheltered life in the organization. They think: I 
do what my boss told me and I do not care anything else.
The main resource that middle-level actors can bring in the illegal busi-
ness is their expertise, their ability to hide informal deals in the formal pro-
cesses. They carry out this “task” for the dominant coalition but they also sell 
this capacity for their own benefit.
“Technicization”: Covering Up for the Elite
Several interviewees explained the middle’s role in hiding illegal and corrupt 
deals that result from the elite’s negotiations, often with outsiders. A middle-
level manager in a Hungarian subsidiary of a multinational firm put this:
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Of course, they need the middle level because the elite simply do not have 
access to certain procedures and forms. It would be really odd to see our 
president typing a call for tender. I am sure, he can make the decision who 
would win but it is a long administrative process before somebody really wins 
the tender and signs the contract.
Our interviews echoed Needleman and Needleman (1979), who claimed 
that superiors use a mixture of coercion and incentives as tools to encourage 
subordinates to act illegally. The middle level often helps in corruption 
because of the danger of being fired. The most typical answers were as 
follows:
If you are not willing to do it, your boss will find someone else who does it.
They just simply told me to delete that record, if you disobey you play with 
your job.
These subordinates fear, they just fear of their job. They dare not disagree.
I am just a bureaucrat with a moderate salary. I often see what is happening but 
if I do not sign the documents I will be fired immediately. I just want to pay my 
mortgage . . . of course I close my eyes and shut my nose.
However, middle-level actors do not always cooperate because of threats. 
Many also engage in the elite’s corruption because they count on some 
reward. Sometimes, rewards for illegal activities seem perfectly legal. We 
collected an anecdote from a manager in a financial department when the 
elite rewarded the middle level from the formal incentive system of the orga-
nization, for its passive cooperation (not reporting suspicious cases) in 
corruption:
Nooo . . . do not tell me that if you are a manager in the financial department 
and see that totally irrational numbers on the contract that you have to put your 
signature on and you do not understand why those numbers are there. Of course 
you will sign it because they [top leaders] grabbed your balls. They know that 
you know. But it is also true that you can expect something extra in return. 
Nobody has to tell a word about anything. I have already seen many ‘in return’ 
things people got for closing their eyes, like brand new company cars, long 
weekends in resorts or paid internships for children.
The theme emerged from our data here is “technicization.” The main goal 
of technicization is to hide an illegal or informal deal and present it as it was 
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in accordance with the organization’s normal operation, internal and external 
regulations and requirements. Organizational technology includes many dif-
ferent forms of processes used to transform inputs into outputs (Scott, 1981). 
We called this theme technicization because in our examples corrupt actors 
manipulated different elements of organizational technology such as engi-
neering, economic, administrative, and legal processes. Technicization 
requires professionals who understand and control technology. The ability to 
manipulate the technological system provides middle-level experts bargain-
ing power over elite members (Jávor, 1988; Pettigrew, 1974; Pfeffer, 1981).
Mainly middle-level professionals hide illegal and corrupt deals behind 
normal operation because they have access to and knowledge about organiza-
tional technology. Of the 138 cases we found, 32 (23%) involved the media-
tor zone converting illegal deals and decisions into technologically correct 
processes. Although the middle level do this work, the main beneficiary here 
is the elite. Technicization cases fall into three subcategories: document 
manipulation, technological conditions, and bureaucratic errors.
Document manipulation. The category of document manipulation integrates 
corruption hiding techniques related to middle-level professionals’ ability to 
control the organization’s administrative document systems. The middle 
level has direct access to organizational documents and enough discretion to 
falsify them. A manager offered this story:
The new expat CFO wanted a maid in his house who would be paid by the 
company. We [department] hired the maid as a normal employee, so she was on 
our headcount. But this was totally against the company’s policy. She could not 
appear on the headcount reports we quarterly sent to the mother company. She 
was in our inside records, but did not show up anywhere else. As with any other 
employee, she was originally on the bonus list, but the HR director told me to 
get rid of her from there. We had to cut these connection points, so that many 
people were told not to give her things that are automatically given when it is a 
new hire . . . for example, meal vouchers, company phone, computer, username 
and password, employee ID and access to the building . . . She was our virtual 
colleague . . . she was the boss’ maid.
There are often hidden agreements in Hungarian public tenders because 
the leaders of the public administration and private organizations have 
already “fixed” who will win the tender even before the publication of tender 
documentation. However, the actors have to play out a show of following a 
seemingly legal selection procedure. The corrupt deal, and the rejection of 
competitors has to be transformed into tender conditions, technological, 
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financial, and reference requirements. If done correctly, these seemingly 
technical requirements will allow only the “correct” (corrupt) applicant to 
win. An ex-middle manager in government who often formulates calls for 
tenders explained how to manipulate documents and “tailor” public tenders:
If you publish a call for a tender legally, it is not easy to tailor it in order to favor 
your friends. Before tendering, you have to start a three to four month process. 
During this period, you are searching the small patterns in the operation of your 
friend’s company which may become extra eligibility criteria of the tender. For 
example, the applicant must have employed four experts of a very special field 
between 2008 and 2010. You have to tread very carefully because you try to 
reduce the number of potential applicants but you must be protected also. You 
have to set up a sophisticated system of requests. Serious expertise is needed to 
tailor the tender documentation for your friend, because if it is a huge project 
you must publish it not only in the Hungarian Official Gazette but in the 
European Union too.
Technological conditions. Illegal deals can be also hidden behind technological 
conditions. Because the rationality of complex technological requirements in 
a contract can be assessed only by a few experts such conditions provide 
effective means to embed corruption in them. An interesting example of this 
category is a highly publicized scandal that was investigated by the Hungar-
ian Public Procurement Council. The Arbitration Committee of the Council 
finally cancelled the results of the competition. This case is especially 
remarkable because the public party who “tailored” the tender was the 
National Tax and Customs Authority (NTCA). The NTCA published a public 
procurement for 100 company cars. The tender conditions stipulated the cars’ 
engine capacity, the car’s length, and the volume of the trunk. For example, 
the cars’ required length was within 1.2 inch margin (4,490-4,520 mm). 
These parameters only met a certain German brand’s cars. The required size 
of the trunk ousted a French brand, and the required length excluded another 
German firm from the competition. Some other brands did not meet the 
engine capacity conditions. According to the assessment criteria, the cost of 
the car weighted only 45% whereas the usual proportion in similar Hungarian 
public tenders is 60%. Because the price was less important, the company 
had to meet only the technological requirements and therefore it was able to 
win with a very expensive bid. This particular case was exposed because one 
of the ousted companies raised an objection.
Bureaucratic errors. The middle level is sometimes able to convert illegal 
practices into bureaucratic “errors.” Here consciously conducted illegal 
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practices are presented, as they were unintended errors of the organizational 
technology. This blurs personal responsibility and the intentional criminal 
character of the corrupt act. A local government member at a downtown dis-
trict of Budapest described how private companies translate deliberate viola-
tions of building rules into accidental mistakes:
Several historical buildings in Budapest are under “street view protection” 
which means that the investor must keep the frontage of the building in the 
original condition. Behind the front they can do whatever they want to. But 
keeping the front is extremely expensive and complicated. So, what happens in 
this situation? Usually the mechanical excavator or backhoe “accidentally” 
grabs the historical frontage. The investor’s senior construction engineer then 
asks for a life-threatening verification for the building from the local 
government which requires them to demolish the whole building. They usually 
bribe the bureaucrat to get this verification quickly. They pretend that it was an 
unintended mistake but indeed they get rid of the costly frontage protection 
passage. Everything looks legal. Nobody is responsible for this but the driver 
of the excavator who will probably get an extra bonus from his boss.
The Middle Level’s Own Corruption
This does not mean that only the dominant coalition uses the middle level to 
cover up and legalize its illegal activities. We found 21 (15%) cases when 
professionals and middle managers were the main beneficiaries of their own 
corrupt practices. We asked why the organization did not recognize these 
illegal actions. The answers revealed two related subthemes: ad hoc deals and 
higher interests.
Ad hoc deals. There are cases where the organization and the dominant coali-
tion do not see the middle level’s corruption because of sophisticated cover-
up techniques, collusion, or structural secrecies. However, the resources that 
the middle level illegally sells are strategically more important than those at 
the bottom and it proves difficult to maintain corruption over a longer term 
without it becoming evident. Thus, these invisible actions tend to become ad 
hoc deals. We interviewed a bank clerk who permitted mortgage loans to 
people who were not entitled because of too low legal income or lack of job. 
Fake employer’s certificates were provided by her friend and colleague who 
recommended the clients to the bank. She explained,
There is a risk. If you are too hungry, sooner or later it will be conspicuous. But 
I make this kind of deal only when everything is perfect . . . and only with 
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people suggested by my friend, it is just some little extra money a year, I think 
it is okay.
Higher interests. There are also cases when the dominant coalition becomes 
aware of corruption in the middle level but does not intervene. Sometimes 
organizations allow misconduct to continue because it is less expensive than 
intervening (Beamish, 2000). However, we found that the typical reason for 
this passivity is often the defense of higher level organizational interests. 
Sanctioning or disrupting illegal activities at the middle may cause a power 
imbalance and a threat to coalition at the top. This example was provided by 
a CEO of a private company with approximately 100 employees, where two 
top executives control the organization. Our informant explained a sensitive 
situation when he realized that another executive’s assistant was corrupt:
I get on well with him [the other executive]. We have been managing the firm 
together for 10 years. I know that his assistant is stealing too much and I hate 
that guy . . . Last year he [the assistant] arranged the firm’s Christmas party and 
it was three times more expensive than the market-price. The costs were just 
ridiculous . . . So, he [the assistant] had the audacity to do this…but I will not 
go after him because it is not worth it . . . I do not need a conflict with my fellow 
CEO, we just run the firm too smoothly together to bother this relationship with 
petty cases.
Dominant Coalition
Organizational elites control crucial organizational resources. This high level 
of discretion allows them to informally reallocate such resources for private 
benefits. Hidden elite cliques or networks of people are often consciously 
organized to protect their members from detection (Baker & Faulkner, 1993; 
Raab & Milward, 2003). Two main mechanisms emerged from our data 
explaining how dominant organizational coalitions keep their machinations 
secret from internal and external observers.
Turning off Inside Control
Our findings suggest that organizational elites are able to deploy more sophis-
ticated techniques to cover up corrupt practices than at lower levels. We 
found that the most important thing in successful corruption is to intention-
ally “turn off” all crucial organizational control mechanisms. There are sev-
eral different forms of control mechanisms that should detect corruption in 
organizations. Control may focus on personal behaviors or outputs and may 
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be transmitted through administrative or social/cultural channels (Ouchi & 
Maguire, 1975). There are also administrative internal mechanisms (compli-
ance management, board of supervision, controllers, quality assurance, trade 
union, etc.) and external controls (regulatory agencies, police, court, public 
prosecutor, chambers, etc.).
Corrupt elites are able to “turn off” these control systems inside or outside 
the organization. The cliques encroach on control points or build informal 
ties to control points through corruption brokers. Finally, these informal net-
works constitute almost complete decontrol circuits in which each crucial 
control mechanism is deactivated (Jávor, 2008).
When the middle level legalizes corrupt transactions, it may also deacti-
vate a control system by falsifying records and manipulating documentation 
or approving improper transactions. However, changing the division of labor, 
rules, processes, and routes of information into less transparent structures is 
also a form of control deactivation. In such cases, the elite intentionally cre-
ates structural secrecy. A chief financial officer of a public company told us 
this story about a new director who significantly reduced organizational 
control:
Previously serious paperwork was needed to verify financial procedures. There 
was a protocol list that must be filled out by the director, the accountant, the 
engineers, and project managers to prove that the project was necessary. It was 
a one-page check list attached to each receipt with many signatures. Now, this 
item is totally missing. The new director just cancelled it. The reason for 
reorganizing these processes was not to create a transparent, straightforward, 
and regulated system. The story was about reducing control. Now, he [the new 
director] can pump money from the firm.
Control Deactivation at the Inter-Organizational Level
Organizational elites are sometimes able to create “professionalized” corrupt 
networks that link together different formal organizations such as private, 
nonprofit, and state owned firms; governmental institutions; and political 
parties. The investigative journalists we interviewed provided detailed 
descriptions of such networks. We collected 14 such cases. These sophisti-
cated structures are intentionally designed by some top leaders. We found 
several cases in which the actors of corrupt cliques were able to reach detec-
tives, judges, and prosecutors. Sometimes they “turn off” the control of the 
judicature when they are under investigation, but in other cases they use the 
police and prosecutors to investigate competitors, investigative journalists, 
opposition political parties, using false or real accusations. The central actors 
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in these networks have meta-power (Baumgartner, Buckley, Burns, & 
Schuster, 1976). They have control not simply over individuals and over 
transactions within a given organizational structure, but over a wider social 
relationship network.
There have been scandals for years in Budapest about some parking com-
panies. Citizens and investigative journalists accused them of unethical busi-
ness practices, false parking tickets, more than suspicious links to politicians 
and political parties, and extreme levels of corruption. Despite these accusa-
tions, these powerful companies seem to be untouchable. A lawyer told us 
this story about a trial in which he defended his client against a parking com-
pany. The case well illustrates how powerful actors are able turn off external 
judicial controls:
The parking company sued my client for unpaid parking tickets. The company’s 
lawyer was not there, just me and the judge. The payable amount was 56 000 
HUF but the case was ambiguous. The judge told me that she had to sentence 
my client at least to half of the amount otherwise the Court of Appeal won’t 
agree with it because the parking company had bought all judges at the Court 
of Appeal. Ordinary people cannot win against the companies, they can do 
everything.
We discovered that an elaborate and time-tested corrupt network can be 
adapted to facilitate many corrupt deals; indeed, the network can be thought 
of as selling corruption services to clients as easily as a finished product. 
Actors who buy the services of a corruption network obtain a complete social 
system with trustworthy personal ties, corruption legalizer functions, and 
inactivated control mechanisms. There are no further costs of partner search-
ing, trust building and problem management.
A CEO of middle-size local company explained us how local government 
leaders and local firms built a corrupt system in an industrial district of 
Budapest. In this example, each party brought its own network of corrupt 
actors into the business:
These guys [at the local government] have standard prices. The deputy mayor, 
the notary, and the director of the Infrastructure Asset Management of the local 
government have the highest tariffs. Seemingly the mayor is not in this 
business, but he must know about it. So, for example, the director’s nickname 
among the local companies is “Dr. 30%.” If we [top managers of local firms] 
talk about Dr. 30% everybody knows who this guy is. You have to meet and 
make a deal with Dr. 30% in a Turkish bath. If you want to win a local public 
tender you have to incorporate the 30% into your price, invoice for 30% more, 
and give him the difference. You apply for the tender, but you have to bring in 
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at least two other firms that will propose offers but not win the tender. They are 
your friends, they help you now, and you help them next time. The typical trick 
is that your offer will be ranked as the second best because its quality is good 
but it is too expensive. One of your friends will win the tender with a cheap 
offer but immediately he will declare a withdrawal from the project. Then the 
second applicant, you, will do the job. If you pay to Dr. 30%, you buy the 
whole tender with its all mechanisms. He guarantees the votes of the local 
assembly members to select your firm; he brings accountants and lawyers who 
will help you. He also has people to get rid of other ‘hostile’ competitors. Do 
not ask me how [laughing].
Discussion
Based on rich empirical materials, this study attempted to identify the main 
resources available for illegal exchange and the mechanisms that make cor-
ruption hidden in organizations. The analysis of 42 semistructured in-depth 
interviews revealed that different amounts and types of resources are avail-
able for illegal exchange at the three levels of an organizational power struc-
ture. In this study, we identified four major themes in organizational 
corruption. Table 3 summarizes the key findings of our study.
We identified isolated collusion at the bottom. Corruption remains invisi-
ble for the organization when the exchanged resources are not associated 
with major strategic organizational goals; therefore, the control mechanisms 
do not even perceive these illegal activities. This is especially true at the low-
est organizational levels. People on the “shop floor” can sell resources ille-
gally by cooperating with their colleagues and immediate supervisors. Their 
opportunity to become corrupt derives from their ability to control and 
manipulate local technologies, information, and processes. Structural posi-
tion also matters. Those who work close to the organizational boundaries and 
have regular contact with outsiders have many more opportunities for corrup-
tion. Corruption at this level is possible because the top of the organization 
“does not care” about it. However these small local networks of corruption at 
the lowest level remain relatively undetected only until the losses reach a 
critical level.
Middle-layer experts’ role in illegal organizational deals is a neglected 
area in the literature. Here we identified two patterns, technicization and the 
middle level’s own corruption. The mediator zone’s repeating (not ad hoc) 
corruption would not be possible without the elite’s knowledge and tacit con-
sent. Corruption at this middle level is possible because the dominant coali-
tion is interested in it somewhat. The main resource that the middle level can 
exchange is based on its professional knowledge and control over the techni-
cal procedures. Middle managers and experts are able to sell technological 
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verifications, economic procedures, analytical data, and legal interpretations 
for private or clique benefits. People at this level have esoteric knowledge to 
translate the intentional inactivation of organizational control mechanisms 
into exceptional mistakes, variances, ambiguous task definitions or inaccu-
rate technological conditions, and seemingly correct documentation (Lozeau, 
Langley, & Denis, 2002). However, the elite’s large-scale corruption wouldn’t 
be possible either without the assistance of the mediator zone. In this study, 
we called the phenomenon of translation of the elite’s illegal deals into the 
formal administrative procedures and technical data by midlevel actors “tech-
nicization” (Jávor, 2008). Because only the mediator zone can do this for the 
elite, the expertise of lawyers, bookkeepers, controllers, engineers, and econ-
omists becomes a marketable asset and these midlevel individuals will 
Table 3. Characteristics of Corruption at Different Levels of an Organizational 
Power Structure.
Bottom level Mediator zone Dominant coalition
Main resources 
available to exchange 
illegally
Control over local 
technologies and 
processes
Professional knowledge: 
Creation and 
manipulation 
technical verifications, 
economic 
procedures, analytical 
data, legal schemes 
and contracts
Control over critical 
resources, regulations, 
strategic decisions, and 
large-scale contracts
Cover-up mechanisms Collusion and 
cooperation with 
others, manipulation 
of local technologies, 
information and 
processes
“Technicization”: 
transformation illegal 
deals and self-interest 
into formal and legal 
forms often for the 
dominant coalition
“Turning off” internal 
and external controls 
intentionally; telling 
the middle level to 
“technicize”
Linkage between the 
levels
Visible mostly to 
local colleagues and 
supervisors who 
often cooperate 
actively or passively
Without the informal 
permission of the 
elite corruption is 
risky for the middle
Dominant coalition needs 
the middle level’s help 
to “technicize”; visible 
to the middle level who 
uses this knowledge 
in informal bargaining; 
penetrate informal 
dependences into the 
hierarchy up
and down
Relation with external 
actors
Illegal business with 
outsiders but tend to 
be one-off relations
Regular relations with 
reliable outsiders
Professional inter-
organizational corrupt 
networks
Effects on the 
hierarchical 
coordination
Do not use critical 
resources, do not 
bother the normal 
organizational 
functions
Increase both 
dependency and 
informal leverage of 
the middle
Corruption becomes a 
management technique; 
reduce the transparency 
and predictability in the 
hierarchy
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definitely sell this skill. The mediator zone “legalizes” and thus embeds cor-
ruption in the everyday formal procedures of the organization.
Organizational literature mentions cases when organizational deviance or 
misconduct, which serves the interest of organizational elites, is hidden into 
seemingly normal processes. This is somewhat similar to our technicization 
phenomenon. In the 1970s in the United States, a large drugstore chain initi-
ated a computer-generated double billing scheme that caused huge costs for 
the government in Medicaid funds (Vaughan, 1983). In this case, organiza-
tional elite used middle-level computer experts to hide the fraud using high 
technology data processing. Another example is the scandalous case of two 
engineers who manipulated the technical results of F-10 bombers’ brake sys-
tem assessment process (Vandivier, 1978). Here the engineers also conducted 
this “technicization” for the benefit of the dominant coalition. There are also 
cases when public hospitals attempted to adopt private sector quality man-
agement programs in response to institutional pressure to obtain accreditation 
(Lozeau et al., 2002). Here, quality management effort was rather driven 
more by the need to satisfy the accreditation agency and the actors used false 
documentation to prove and legitimate the changes while the actual quality of 
care was not improved.
Knowledge about others’ corrupt behavior may be used as leverage in 
negotiations and becomes a special management control technique. The dom-
inant coalition sees the professional group’s illegal machinations, the middle 
level’s own corruption. The knowledge about each other’s wrongdoing results 
in mutual dependence between the two groups but also provides bargaining 
power to them (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, p. 40; Smith, 1991). A bartender in 
a large discotheque told us his opinion about this interdependence:
If you put your knife to someone’s throat you can be sure that the other man 
will put his knife to yours too. It is true, the bar manager knows things about 
me, but I also know about his plays with those beer wholesale guys. So, we are 
both dirty. Conclusion? The chances of being caught are minimal . . . for both 
of us . . .
Middle-level professionals in corruption were often rewarded by the elite 
from the formal incentive system. They received a new company car, an extra 
bonus, or a sponsored vacation. However, earlier studies reported that tolerat-
ing corruption as “unofficial rewards” sometimes becomes a significant ele-
ment of the incentive system (Banfield, 1975; Dalton, 1987). We also found 
that in return for its loyalty and help in top-level corruption, the organiza-
tional elite often tolerates illegal practices by midlevel personnel and allows 
this middle level to sell its expertise and knowledge for its own benefit 
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(Hansen, 1999). They are informally permitted by the elite to build their own 
client networks whose members will win tenders and become midsize suppli-
ers to the organization. These mechanisms result in a politicized, sometimes 
terrified but loyal group of professionals and experts who are motivated by 
corruption. Therefore, corruption becomes one of the tools of managing with 
power (Pfeffer, 1993). In our cases power relations based on participation in 
corrupt exchanges often become an element of management practices. A mar-
keting manager of a middle size IT company told us as follows:
I control the whole annual media budget. I think this position is typically one 
where you can get back something in return for giving an order. You buy media 
for your company but it is not a concrete thing…a web page design, digital 
artwork or an advertising campaign. It is not like a pallet of cement. You have 
room for maneuvering with the prize and you can easily hide your share in it . . . 
For instance, I surrounded the company with small firms; firms of my schoolmates 
and best friends. I order the media from them and then they buy the real service 
from the real providers. I could not do this without the informal approval of my 
CEO. Yes I can earn real money, but I do favors for him. It is like he calls me 
in the middle of the night and says: I need 10 million HUF in cash tomorrow 
morning. And then, this is my job to squeeze this money out for him from 
somewhere the system and do the paperwork. Actually I am his cashier . . . ”
The highest level of an organization —the dominant coalition—controls 
the most important decisions and organizational resources. These organiza-
tional leaders have the opportunity to informally sell the whole organiza-
tional operation (Weick, 1979). They decide who the contractors of the 
organization will be, and they influence contracts with others in the organiza-
tion’s social, economic, and political environment. Here, we identified two 
mechanisms used by the elite to “turn off” controls and thus hide corruption. 
Elites can intentionally “turn off” controls and build professionally designed 
inter-organizational corrupt networks that are market assets, because the fact 
that they are tested and reliable makes them cheap and less risky than pursu-
ing business in a non-corrupt way. Thus a market for corrupt networks 
emerges. Exercising their networking power, elites are able to control almost 
all critical factors in the corrupt exchange systems.
We believe that it is hard to capture the complexity of organizational cor-
ruption with a single perspective. Different approaches cast light on different 
dimensions of the phenomenon. The viewpoint of this paper differs from the 
systemic view of organizational deviance in the way that our emphasis is not 
on normalization, socialization, culture, or motivation but rather on power 
structures and resource exchange. The “normalization approach” suggests 
that actors participate in corruption almost unconsciously because they do 
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not see their behavior as deviant or wrong. This paper is based on an organi-
zational power approach. Our empirical findings suggest that actors are 
clearly aware of other’s corruption around them and use this knowledge in 
informal bargaining, blackmailing, threatening, and rewarding. They con-
sider the possible risks, benefits, and punishments participating in corrupt 
games. They intentionally use their professional knowledge and positional 
power to alter the organizational structure to cover up corruption.
Based on our experience in this study, we can provide some suggestions 
about how to prevent or reduce corruption. We believe that the existence of 
three important conditions is necessary to launch successful anti-corruption 
programs in an organization. First, there must be some organizational actors 
who are interested in reducing corruption. These actors must believe that cor-
ruption represents a higher risk for the organization than the impacts that 
drastic corruption reduction efforts might trigger such as losing orders and 
tenders and the emergence power struggles among elites. Second, such actors 
should have enough power to initiate an anti-corruption strategy. This means 
that anti-corruption is only possible if a significant fraction of the dominant 
coalition supports it. Finally, such reformers should be willing to come into 
fierce conflicts with their colleagues who are the main beneficiaries of orga-
nizational corruption. Briefly, the organization’s power systems should be 
radically restructured by elite members who are supportive toward corruption 
reduction.
There are some obvious limitations of our research. It represents a single 
case study. One might reasonably ask whether research findings based on a 
non-representative sample in Hungary can be generalized to other settings. 
Our view is that, at a minimum, research on corruption in the Hungarian 
context yields insights into various organizational aspects of corruption in 
that particular context. We also believe that our exploratory study has gener-
ated new ideas and conjectures for further research. The phenomena that we 
observed in Hungary may be present to varying degrees in other countries 
and cultures. However, further research is needed in different organizational, 
political, and cultural environments to verify whether these features really 
exist in other parts of the world.
Conclusion
This article addressed the questions of what kinds of resources are available 
to, and used illegally at, the different levels of an organizational structure and 
what mechanisms make corruption effective.
Our research indicates that organizational resources are crucial elements 
of corrupt transactions. Therefore, the working definition of this study should 
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be completed with this “resource” component: Corruption is abuse, or mis-
use, of authority for personal, subunit, or organizational benefits by inten-
tional reallocation of organizational resources.
The organization’s formal and informal systems, its legitimate and corrupt 
activities, become twisted and embedded in each other. In the formal system, 
the organization seemingly functions well, and finances, motivates, monitors, 
and controls its members; however, the informal corrupt system can trans-
form all of these processes and relations. This transformation is based on 
power relations that do not always reflect perfectly the formal hierarchy.
The findings suggest that the middle level has an important role in organi-
zational corruption in two ways. First, this level acts as a buffer between the 
top and the lower levels. Professionals (lawyers, bookkeepers, engineers, 
etc.) and middle managers at this layer detect the lower levels’ corruption but 
reduce its impact on the higher spheres of the organization. They convert the 
losses caused by illegal activities of low-level actors into justifiable legal 
costs. Thus the middle level “technicizes” corruption and embeds it into the 
normal operation. Second, the middle also has in important “top-down- buf-
fer role” when it converts legal and illegal deals and decisions made by the 
elite, into numbers, processes, rules, technical solutions, and legally correct 
contracts. For example, professionals can manipulate public procurements by 
adding unnecessary technical requirement to the tender documentation. Here, 
“technicization” means collecting technical data about the “winner” com-
pany but not because they want to improve the technical quality of the tender. 
This activity is very similar to industrial espionage, gathering, analyzing, and 
managing information to find eligibility criteria applicable only to the 
“friendly” firm.
One of our main findings is that in organizational corruption, the top level 
often colludes with the mediator zone, middle-level professionals, and man-
agers. Both parties use the opportunities in corrupt agreements available at 
their power level. Usually the dominant coalition makes the corrupt deal; 
however, without the help of the middle-level, top executives would not be 
able to manage the entire corrupt transaction. The top can deactivate several 
internal and external controls, but the middle elaborates the corrupt contract’s 
technical, economic, and legal parameters. Through this “technicization,” the 
middle level acts in its own interest.
Our article contributes to a better understanding of how and why corrup-
tion takes place in formal organizational context. The organizational power 
approach, emphasized in this paper, focuses on the opportunity structure of 
corruption. The question is not who benefits in corruption but rather from 
where the corrupt profit is extracted and who has opportunity to extract it. 
Corruption may have two main sources in an organization. First, the actors 
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often use the available spare resources, the slack in the system as an exchange-
able resource. Second, corrupt cliques can also “eat up” the technical quality 
and the goals of the organization. In the first case, corruption leads to corrupt 
culture and widespread informal relationships while the second case might 
result in lower quality standards and reduced efficiency and profit.
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